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COMMENT: PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND
PRIVATE SALES OF SECURITIES
Ajai Singht
A number of studies have examined public offers of securities,
and several others document the stock market's reaction to the an-
nouncement of private placement of corresponding securities. The
purpose of this Comment is to compare and contrast the market's re-
action to announcements of public offers and private placements of
similar securities.
It is interesting that public offers of common stock, and other se-
curities convertible into common stock, evoke a large negative re-
sponse from the stock market.1 Myers and Majluf, among others, ar-
gue that managers are likely to sell common stock when it is overval-
ued.2 The sale of undervalued stock dilutes the market value of pre-
existing stockholders' equity and the market realizes that insiders
have an incentive to issue overvalued equity. Accordingly, the mar-
ket treats announcements of new equity offers as negative informa-
tion. It is argued that securities convertible into common stock are
quasi-equity and can be thought of as back door offers of equity. The
stock market similarly treats announcements of convertible securities
(convertible bonds or convertible preferred, convertible into shares of
common stock) as negative information. The magnitude of the reac-
tion to convertible offers, however, is slightly less negative.3 Offers
of non-convertible (straight) debt are associated with a negative but
relatively neutral response.
This set of market responses to public offers of securities is con-
sistent with explanations offered by Myers and Majluf.4 It suggests
that the investors are suspicious of sales of equity-like securities and
t Professor, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University.1 See infra Table 1.
2 See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187,
194-95 (1984).
3 See Larry Y. Dann & Wayne H. Mikkelson, Convertible Debt Issuance, Capital Struc-
ture Change and Financing-Related Information: Some New Evidence, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 157,
184-85 (1984).
4 See Myers & Majluf, supra note 2, at 214-15.
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treat the associated announcements as a release of negative informa-
tion. On the other hand, announcements of private placement of
common stock and securities convertible into common are associated
with significantly positive stock price reactions. It has been argued
that smart institutional investors agree to a private purchase of a secu-
rity only if they have performed due diligence and are satisfied with
the prospects of the firm. Additionally, large investments made by a
relatively small group of institutional investors assure the investing
public that the issuing firm will be monitored. By agreeing to subject
themselves to increased monitoring by sophisticated investors, man-
agers are signaling that they are unlikely to misuse the free cash flows
of the firm. Thus, reduced agency costs will also be a positive signal
to the investing public. Accordingly, announcements of private
placements of equity and quasi-equity securities are associated with a
positive reaction.5
This evidence is consistent with announcements of firms enter-
ing into a bank loan agreement. It is argued that banks have expertise
in information collection processing and monitoring of firms' ongo-
ing activity. Thus, when firms announce that they are entering into a
bank loan arrangement, these announcements are met with a positive
stock market response. 6 It is argued that the presence of a sophisti-
cated monitoring agency (namely the bank) reduces the agency cost
for the remaining investors and results in increased stock price.
As in the case of public offers of non-convertible (straight) debt,
the private placement announcements are also met with a negative but
relatively neutral market response.
CONCLUSION
Public offers of equity and quasi-equity securities evoke a
negative response from the stock market. In contrast, private
placements of these same securities are associated with a positive
reaction. It is argued that public offerings of common stock and
convertibles are viewed as a sale of oveivalued securities and are
accordingly treated as negative information. Private placements
signal increased monitoring by sophisticated investors and argua-
bly reduce agency costs. Therefore, the reaction is positive. Pub-
5 See Karen Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from
Private Equity Financings, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 23 (1989) ("The announcement of a private sale
of equity... increases shareholder wealth by 4.5% on average."); see also L. Paige Fields &
Eric L. Mais, The Valuation Effects of Private Placements of Convertible Debt, 46 J. FIN. 1925,
1926 (1991) (hypothesizing that private placement announcements create positive reactions
because of the effects of such placement on ownership structure, tax situation, and information
regarding future cash flow).
6 See Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN.
ECON. 217, 226 (1987) ("The positive stock price response to bank loan agreements contrasts
with the non-positive response to public offerings of securities reported by other researchers.").
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lic and private sales of non-convertible (straight) debt are viewed
as an informationally neutral event.
Table 1
A Summary of Announcement Period Common Stock Average
Abnormal Returns, Recorded Across Studies, for Public Offer-
ings and Private Sale of Common Stock, Convertible Debt,
Straight Debt, and Bank Loans
Security Type Public Offer Private Placements
Common Stock -3.14%7  4.5%8
Convertible Debt -2.31%9  1.80%"'
Straight Debt -0.26%" -0.91%12
(not regarded by the
author as statistically
significant)
Bank Loans n/a 1.93%
13
7 Clifford W. Smith, Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process, 15 J. FIN.
ECON. 3,5 (1986).
8 Wruck, supra note 5, at 23.
9 Dann & Mikkelson, supra note 3, at 171.
10 Fields & Mais, supra note 5, at 1925.
" Smith, supra note 7, at 5; see also B. Espen Eckbo, Valuation Effects of Corporate
Debt Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 148 (1986) ("Straight debt offerings have a non-positive
impact on the issuing firn's common stock price .. "); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan
Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31,
51 (1986) ("The average price reaction to the announcement of... straight debt... is small and
not significant... ").
12 James, supra note 6, at 225; see also Mikkelson & Partch, supra note 11, at 58 (finding
no statistically significant difference in the reactions to straight debt financing through public
offering or private placement).
13 James, supra note 6, at 225.
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